I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning on January 31, 2000, at least 100,000 cubic meters of highly polluted water escaped from a tailings dam at the Aurul gold mine in Baia Mare, Romania. 1 The water flowed into the Somes, Tisza, and Danube Rivers, causing enormous environmental damage. Most of the damage occurred in Hungary, downstream from Baia Mare. Hungarian politicians called the spill "the first, most serious environment [al] catastrophe in the 21 st century," 2 and "the worst ecological disaster in central Europe since Chernobyl in 1986." 3 More striking than the resemblance to the Chernobyl disaster, though, was the resemblance to another 1986 environmental catastrophe: the Sandoz warehouse fire at Schweizerhalle, near Basel, Switzerland, which released over 10,000 cubic meters of highly contaminated water into the Rhine. 4 In each of these instances, an international environmental legal regime ostensibly protected the affected river system; however, international law failed to prevent or reduce the impact of the accident in each case.
Fourteen years after the Sandoz spill, Europe's river systems remain unacceptably vulnerable to catastrophic chemical accidents. This article explores the growth of the environmental regime of one such system, the Danube basin, and the weaknesses revealed by the Baia Mare accident.
II. THE BAIA MARE ACCIDENT AND RELATED INCIDENTS

A. Baia Mare
Baia Mare is located in northern Romania near the borders of Hungary and Ukraine. West of Baia Mare, the Somes River flows across the border into Hungary, where it joins the Tisza. The Tisza denotes the Romania-Ukraine border north of Baia Mare. To the east of Baia Mare, between the town of Baia Borsa and the border, the Vaser River flows Tailings from the mine are collected behind a tailings dam. 10 The tailings are mixed with a cyanide solution to aid in extracting the metal from the ore.
11 During the month of January, ice and snow built up on the dam, causing water levels behind the dam to rise to levels higher than normal. 12 There is still some dispute as to the date and cause of the dam failure, but on January 30 or 31, the water overtopped the dam or the dam burst. 13 For the next four to five days, water containing cyanide and heavy metals flowed over the dam into the local creek system, and from there into the Somes (known in Hungary as the Szamos).
14 As noted, the Somes joins the Tisza in Hungary; the Tisza flows through Hungary and (very briefly) Slovakia and Ukraine, before entering Yugoslavia and joining the Danube upstream from Belgrade. 15 The polluted water thus ended up in the Hungarian portion of the Tisza.
After the accident, a water monitoring station at Szolnok in Hungary measured cyanide levels more than 700 times the usual amounts;
16 nine days later, the levels were still twenty-eight times the maximum safe 5 See, e.g., EUROMAP, ROMANIA, MOLDAVIA (map) (1999) . 6 Mann I, supra note 3. 7 Esmeralda owns 50% of Aurul S.A., which owns the Aurul S.A. Tailings 10 "Tailings" are "residue separated in the preparation of various products (as grains or ores)." WEBSTERS NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1202 (1986) . 11 See Death on the Danube, ECONOMIST , Feb. 19-25, 2000, at 53. 12 See Middleton, supra note 9. 13 Esmeralda Chairman Brett Montgomery maintains that there was an overflow, rather than structural failure of the dam. See Middleton, supra note 9.
14 See Middleton, supra note 9; See also Trevor Sykes, A Fishy Side to the Great Hungarian Cyanide Hysteria, AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REV., Feb. 12, 2000, at 14, available at 2000 WL 3977245. 15 See The Balkans, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Feb. 2000 (map insert) [hereinafter The Balkans] . 16 See Mann I, supra note 3; See also Middleton, supra note 9 ("800 times the acceptable level"). Virginia Environmental Law Journal [Vol. nn:ppp level. 17 The Hungarian authorities banned fishing and all contact with the water of the Somes; it appears that all animal life in the Hungarian section of the Somes was killed. 18 The spill continued to move downstream with the current, contaminating the Tisza, which provides drinking water for two million Hungarians. Some industrial facilities were closed and authorities provided schools and hospitals with distilled water. 19 Near Csongrad, far downstream from the accident, cyanide levels were twenty times the allowed maximum. 20 Emergency services blocked the river with barges and filled railway cars with dead fish scooped from the river. 21 One Hungarian leader said of the river, " [i] t is as if a neutron bomb had been detonated. All the living organisms have been destroyed." 22 By February 11, the spill had reached the border between Hungary and Yugoslavia. 23 Yugoslav authorities reported an initial cyanide level of 0.13 milligrams per liter, falling to .07 milligrams per liter later in the day. 24 Serbian authorities prohibited use of the waters of the Tisza (known in Yugoslavia as the Tisa). 25 Serbian environment minister Branislaw Blazic declared, " [t] he Tisza has been murdered . . . this is an absolute catastrophe." 26 By February 19, the Tisza was almost entirely lifeless over the nearly 1,000 kilometer stretch between the Somes and the Danube. Hungarian and Yugoslavian workers had removed more than 100 metric tons of fish from the Tisza. 27 Fishermen along the river hung black banners from their houses and bridges; the Tisza fishing industry had employed 15,000 people. 28 Damage to the Danube, a much larger river, was less severe. At the Iron Gates I Dam on the Yugoslav-Romanian border, cyanide levels were still measurably above safe levels for fish. 29 Thus the "toxic bullet" of 17 See Mann I, supra note 3. 18 See Middleton, supra note 9. 19 See Mann I, supra note 3. 20 The damage to the Tisza had severe short-term economic and environmental effects and may also have significant long-term effects. For example, the bed of the Tisza may remain contaminated with heavy metals for the next five years. 31 In addition to the destruction of the fishing industry and the contamination of the river bed by heavy metals, some species of animals unique to the Tisza may become extinct.
32
B. Other Spills
No watercourse disaster would be complete without a few echoes. To some extent, a particularly serious spill serves to focus attention on smaller spills that might otherwise be overlooked. Unscrupulous plant operators, however, may also take advantage of the larger disaster to conceal smaller "accidental" releases of wastes.
In northern Romania, a combination of heavy precipitation and a period of unusually cold temperatures impounded large quantities of water; rising temperatures then caused flooding throughout the regio n. In combination with the region's mining industry, which operates with smaller margins for safety than might be tolerated in some wealthier countries, this flooding contributed to at least three serious toxic accidents.
33
Eastern Europe, of course, is an environmentally troubled region. Industrial towns such as Baia Mare have paid a serious price for decades of poorly regulated development: the life expectancy in Baia Mare is 63 years, six years less than the Romanian average. 34 In 1999, a release of toxic waste in Yugoslavia severely damaged the Timok River, whose confluence with the Danube marks the border between Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria. 35 After the Baia Mare spill, a smaller spill of cyanide from a northern Romanian coal mine into the Somes added to the contamination. 36 Two spills at a zinc and lead mine at Baia Borsa released more than The waste flowed into the Viseu and the Tisza upstream from the Somes, contaminating parts of the river spared from the Baia Mare spill. 38 World Wide Fund for Nature spokesperson Jan Korabov also made the Chernobyl comparison: "It would not be an exaggeration to put what has happened here in the past few weeks on a par with Chernobyl."
39 Korabov pointed out that the effects of the Baia Borsa spills on river life might have been far more catastrophic but for the fact that almost all of the river life had been killed by the Baia Mare spill. 40 Recognizing the continuing danger of such spills, R omanian environment minister Romica Tomescu stated that 41 mines in Romania were known to be in a dangerous cond ition.
41
C. Reactions to the Spill
While Hungary and Yugoslavia reacted with outrage, Esmeralda, the Australian mining company, reacted with almost complete denial. Esmeralda chairman Brett Mongomery said that the Hungarian government had "grossly exaggerated" the amount of damage. 42 Hungarian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Gabor Horvath responded that "a person who calls a five-kilometer long carpet of dead fish floating along the river 'grossly exaggerated' is either genuinely unaware of the facts or wants to ignore them." 43 Montgomery also said that the fish may have been killed by a natural increase in the turbidity or salinity of the river. 44 He referred to a conspiracy against Esmeralda and said he had not considered the spill to be a major problem until he was contacted by the Mining Protection Institute, who threatened to make the spill "an international political issue." 45 Esmeralda claimed that environmental standards in Romania were at least as high as those in Australia. 46 Montgomery claimed that Esmeralda was not liable for any damage caused by the spill, because the site was 37 
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The Danube basin is to some extent governed by a treaty regime, although gaps in that regime may be filled by customary international law.
A. Sources of International Law
For purposes of this article it will be simplest to consider two categories of international law. The first, conventional international law, includes rules of law set out in written form and affirmatively agreed to by states; treaties and other international agreements fall in to this category. The second category is customary law. In the absence of applicable conventional law, rules of international law may be derived from "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."
69 Customary law thus consists of those rules that, although not formalized by international agreement, are followed by states out of a sense of legal obligation. In addition to these two categories, "[g]eneral principles of law" have traditionally been viewed as a third category of public international law. 70 However, they can also be seen as "supplementary rules" or a "secondary source of law."
71 For example, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most qualified publicists are a "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." 72 In any event, domestic judicial decisions and, to the extent that a state actually observes them, general principles of law are state practice, and thus form the basis for normative expectations.
B. Treaties and International Agreements Protecting the Waters of the Tisza and the Danube Basin
There is a considerable body of treaty law governing the uses of the waters of the Danube basin, including the Somes, the Vaser, and the Tisza. Many of these treaties are primarily concerned with navigation, the defining of borders, and undertakings such as the Iron Gates and GabcikovoNagymaros projects. There are also some specifically environmental agreements, as well as environmental provisions in navigation treaties. Prior to World War I, environmental preservation for its own sake was rarely a goal of government policy in Europe or elsewhere. Some Danube treaties from that period include quasi-environmental provisions primarily intended to preserve the river's navigability and to prevent the introductio n of diseases from Turkey to Europe.
74
After World War I, the political map of the Danube basin underwent significant changes. Three major riparian states -the Ottoman Empire, the German Empire, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire -ceased to exist. In their place appeared what twelve years ago might still have been a recognizable political map of Eastern Europe.
As with the pre-war treaties, the Treaties of Versailles and Trianon made extensive provisions for the regime of navigation on the Danube but said little about non-navigational uses of the river.
75 By 1921, the new navigation regime had been codified in the Definitive Statute of the Danube. 76 Although the post-war treaties actually reflected less concern with quarantine and sanitary regulations, 77 new non-navigational concerns began to appear. In particular, Article 293 of the Treaty of Trianon set up a Hydraulic System Commission with jurisdiction over non-navigational uses of much of the Danube basin. Article 293 also provided that "[a]ny dispute which may arise out of the matters dealt with in this Article shall be settled as provided by the League of Nations." 80 Later, the Treaty of Sinaia provided for arbitration as well.
81
The post-war treaties thus anticipated the need to resolve disputes arising from conflicting non-navigational uses and from conflicts between navigational and non-navigational uses. The Treaty of Trianon provided that the tribunal resolving such conflicts would make "due allowance in its dec ision for all rights in connection wit h irrigation, water power, fisheries, and other national interests, which, with the consent of all the riparian States or of all the States represented on the International Commission, shall be given priority over the requirements of navigation." 82 Thus, Trianon represented a step in the transition to a world in which rivers are primarily valued for their non-navigational uses.
After World War II, however, the river system seems to have declined in relative political importance. From 1945 to 1989, most of the lower Danube Basin was effectively under the control of a single, relatively minor riparian state: the Soviet Union. Thus, the post-war regime of navigation on the river (which added little in the way of environmental provisions) replaced the previous twocommission regime with a single-commission system. 85 Furthermore, the old non-riparian participants in the navigation regime (Britain, France, and Italy) were completely excluded from participation.
86
Other non-environmental Danube-specific treaties, which nonetheless contained some environmental provisions, dealt with the Iron Gates and 79 See id. 80 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros projects. 87 The post-war era also saw a dramatic increase worldwide in the number of treaties dealing specifically with environmental concerns.
In 1958, the lower riparian states began efforts to protect fisheries in the 90 Articles 1 and 3 of the Convention defined the area governed by the treaty in a way that would exclude almost all of the Tisza and all of the tributaries of the Tisza affected by the Romanian spills. 91 The Danube itself and the Tisza at its junction with the Danube in Yugoslavia, however, would be covered by the Convention. Under the Convention, Romania was obligated "to work out and apply measures to prevent the contamination and pollution of the river . . . by . . . waste from industrial and municipal undertakings which are harmful to fish and other aquatic organisms [.] " 92 The spills themselves are evidence, however, that any such measures that might have existed in Romania were either inadequate or improperly applied.
The Convention did create an obligation on the part of Romania toward Hungary; however, this obligation was not violated in the Baia Mare and Baia Borsa spills, as none of the waters in Hungary covered by the treaty were affected by the accident. 93 The same was true of Ukraine, which is not a party to the treaty; the Soviet Union's rights and responsibilities have passed to the Russian Federation. 94 The state currently known as Yugoslavia is apparently not a party either, though its status is less clear.
95 If (as seems likely) the contracting parties were forming obligations vis -à-vis each other, rather than mutually agreeing to undertake some form of obligations erga omnes, Romania did not violate any obligation to Yugoslavia.
In Romania, Hungary, Ukraine, and Slovakia are all signatories to the Convention on Cooperation for the Protectio n and Sustainable Use of the Danube; of the four, all but Ukraine have ratified or otherwise become parties to the Convention, which provides similar protections to the river, although with greater specificity. 110 The Convention also incorporates the precautionary and polluter-pays principles, although not the inter-generational equity principle. 111 The Danube Protection Convention is nonetheless "greener" than the U.N. Convention, 112 as it sets a standard of sustainable, rather than equitable, use.
113 It imposes similar duties to "prevent, control and reduce transboundary impact" from pollution. 114 For example, "[o]re preparation" is specifically listed as a hazardous activity. 115 There are also duties to warn of accidental pollution, 116 and to consult with affected lower riparians. 117 Romania's violation of or compliance with these various provisions would be essentially the same as under the U.N. Convention. The Danube Protection Convention does, however, offer a stronger dispute resolution mechanism. Article 24 of the Convention is worded somewhat differently from Article 22 of the U.N. Convention, in a way that suggests that acceptance of 107 
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From Schweizerhalle to Baia Mare 117 after the documentation was produced "without undue delay", Romania should have entered into consultations with Hungary concerning ways in which the adverse impact might be reduced or eliminated. 130 The Espoo Convention is not in force, however, and the incomplete Danube treaty regime offers no equivalent.
Overall, the treaty regime protecting the Danube is far less comprehensive than that protecting Europe's other great international river, the Rhine. 131 The Rhine treaty regime includes, inter alia, a treaty creating a multinational Commission charged with the protection of the river against pollution, 132 a treaty seeking to protect the river from chemical pollution, with detailed lists of prohibited and restricted pollutants, 133 and a convention dealing with the specific problem of chloride pollution from the French potassium mines in Alsace. 134 There are also regional treaty commissions charged with protecting specific tributaries or regions of the Rhine, such as the Saar, the Moselle, and Lake Constance.
135 Also, unlike the Danube, the Rhine is largely protected by European Union law, since most of the riparian states of the Rhine are also members of the EU.
C. Customary International Law Governing the Use of the Waters of Transboundary Watercourses
Although Romania evidently violated its obligations under the U.N. Convention to Ukraine, Hungary, and Slovakia, it did not violate its obligations to Yugoslavia. Romania may still have a duty to Yugoslavia, however, under customary international law since this body of law may fill any gaps in the set of rights and duties defined by the U.N. Convention.
Customary international law has long recognized limits on the discharge of pollutants into rivers. 136 The exact nature and extent of those Smelter principle (see note 133 , infra, and accompanying text). One of the earlier declarations of this principle in the past century was in the Donauversinkung case: "When utilizing an international watercourse in its territory, every State is bound by the principle springing from the idea of the community of nations based on international law: that it may not injure another member of the international community." Donau-Virginia Environmental Law Journal [Vol. nn:ppp limits, however, are somewhat hard to determine. The right of a downstream neighbor to receive an uninterrupted flow of uncontaminated water must be balanced against the right of the upper riparian to make equitable use of the river's waters.
137
The approach generally taken to balance the rights of lower and upper riparian owners is one of limited territorial sovereignty. 138 The territorial integrity interest of the lower riparian is balanced against the territorial sovereignty interest of the upper riparian. Limited territorial sovereignty is not fixed, however, but is a movable point somewhere along a continuum between absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity. Romania had both a sovereign right to exploit resources within its territory and a duty to respect the territorial integrity of lower riparians (such as Yugoslavia) by preventing or minimizing harm from those activities. The exact amount of harm that an upper riparian might be permitted to cause lower riparians in the exercise of its right is, of course, likely to be a highly contentious matter, and has led many environmentalists and scholars to embrace an alternative -the community theory.
A fourth approach to the management of international freshwater resources, the community or drainage basin management theory,
139 has yet to find acceptance in the practice of states. While theorists embrace the community theory, states are reluctant to sacrifice their sovereignty to a drainage basin management authority. Furthermore, most upper riparians seem to see the community theory as a product of the environmental movement and as more likely to protect the interests of downstream states. 138 For a full discussion of the competing approaches to this question, see generally Diverting the Danube, supra note 74, at 325-40 (indicating a lack of a high degree of normativeness by using the term "approach" instead of "rule"). The present situation in the Danube Basin is unusual because many of the riparian states did not exist in their present form as little as a decade ago. Thus, it is difficult to make any specific predictions about the conduct of the riparian states based upon their past conduct. In a broader sense, however, the practice of the world's states in similar situations may provide a normative framework within which to evaluate the responsibilities of Romania to Yugoslavia and the other lower riparians.
Decisions of International Tribunals
Basic principles of the customary international law of state responsibility for transboundary harm are generally seen as having been developed through the Trail Smelter arbitration, 140 the Corfu Channel case, 141 and the Lake Lanoux arbitration. 142 The Trail Smelter tribunal, i n dicta, first expressed the principle that a state has responsibility for environmental damage extending beyond its territorial limits:
[N]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence. Virginia Environmental Law Journal [Vol. nn:ppp
Aspirational Documents and Pronouncements of International Bodies
Public and private international organizations have also addressed the problem of transboundary environmental harm. While the aspirational documents thus produced create no legally binding obligations, they may serve to show "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations [.] " 146 To the extent that they are promulgated (especially in the case of General Assembly resolutions) by certain states and not by others, they may also provide insight into the practice or expectations of those states.
a. The Stockholm Declaration
Principle 21 of the United Nations' Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment 147 is generally viewed as having attained the status of customary international law. 148 Principle 21 provides that states have the "sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies [.] " 149 Along with this right, though, comes the "responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." 150 The Stockholm Declaration thus incorporates the Corfu Channel standard that no state may allow its territory to 
b. The Helsinki Rules
The Helsinki Rules promulgated by the International Law Association also assume limited territorial sovereignty. 151 Article IV of the Helsinki Rules states the "equitable use" concept: "[e]ach basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin."
152 Among the factors to be used in determining what is reasonable and equitable, are the economic and social needs of each state, 153 the population in each basin state dependent on the waters of the basin, 154 and the degree to which waste and unnecessary injury can be avoided. 155 The first of these factors seems to weigh on the side of Romania; its need for development is great. The Aurul mine, for example, provided 3,000 desperately needed jobs in Baia Mare. 156 The others, though, favor the injured lower riparians: two million Hungarians drew drinking water from the Tisza, and the cost of protective measures -higher and betterconstructed tailings dams -would have been relatively slight.
The Helsinki Rules use a "substantial injury" standard to determine whether a state's use of water is reasonable and equitable. 157 Article X prohibits "any new form of water pollution or any increase in the degree of existing water pollution in an international drainage basin which would cause substantial injury in the territory of a co-basin State[.]" 158 Article XI provides that a polluting state must cease the polluting activity and compensate the injured state. 159 The injury to the Tisza, and thus to Hungary and perhaps Yugoslavia, was certainly "substantial," and both countries have announced their intention to seek compensation.
c. The World Charter for Nature
The World Charter for Nature (in actuality, merely a General Assembly resolution) provides that "States. 161 The significant substitution of "natural systems" for "environment" seems to imply liability even in the absence of economically quantifiable harm. In the Baia Mara and Baia Borsa spills, of course, both quantifiable economic harm and intangible harm to "natural systems" are present.
d. The Rio Declaration
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration 162 is identical to The World Charter for Nature, with the exception of two added words to Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 163 Those two added words ("and developmental" ) shift the balance between territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity toward the former, favoring developing nations and upper riparians (in this case, Romania). The Rio Declaration does, however, require environmental impact assessment 164 and "prior and timely notification to . 163 Id. Principle 2 (emphasis added). The added words reflect the major concern of the Rio Conference: balancing developing nations' needs against the environmental concerns of the developed countries. While the added words would seem to indicate that Romania can place a high priority on development if it wishes, Romania still has an obligation to ensure that the activity causes no harm to Hungary. 164 Protection of water for drinking, fishing, and agriculture might take priority over mining uses: "In the event of a conflict between uses of an international watercourse, it shall be resolved . . . with special regard being given to the requirements of vital human needs."
173 Part III of the Convention (Planned Measures) would have required Romania to notify, consult, and negotiate with the lower riparians when planning activities such as the Aurul tailings operation, that had the potential to adversely affect the lower riparians. 174 Finally, the Convention provides detailed dispute settlement procedures. 175 
IV. THE FUTURE OF EUROPE'S INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES
The treaty regime protecting the Danube basin has proved inadequate, just as the Rhine treaty regime proved inadequate in 1986. Under the current system, whenever northern Romania experiences heavy flooding, the Tisza will be endangered.
There are signs, however, that the situation along the Danube will improve. Just as the Sandoz spill focused attention on the Rhine, the Baia Mare spill has focused attention on the Danube and its tributaries. The Debrecen agreement is an encouraging sign. In addition, it should be noted that the legal structures protecting the Danube -especially the Danube Protection Convention and the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube -are very new. The Romanian spills have provided the current protective regime with its first real test, which it
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From Schweizerhalle to Baia Mare 125 seems to have passed. All of the actors, including Romania, seem genuinely committed to addressing the situation. However, two major problems remain. The first is the economic and political inequality that exists along the Danube; the second is that solving the problems of the Danube will not solve the problems of other rivers.
A. Inequality Along the Danube
Economic and political inequality was not present along the Rhine in 1986. The riparian states of the Rhine are all wealthy, developed, democratic countries. Most are members of what is now the European Union. Those that were not members (Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Austria) were thoroughly integrated into the Western capitalist economy and, while theoretically neutral, clearly aligned with the West during the Cold War era. All the riparian states of the Rhine had been at peace both internally and with each other for decades.
A similarly benign situation does not exist along the Danube. The riparian states include wealthy states such as Germany and Austria (also Rhine riparians), as well as impoverished, war-torn states such as Yugoslavia. While all of the riparian states are nominally democratic, the degree of individual liberty and participation in the political process varies greatly between them.
In such a situation, it is inevitable that some wealthy democratic states will attempt to export their environmental problems to poorer (and sometimes less democratic) ones. Austria, for example, helped finance the controversial Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project in exchange for a promised share of the electricity to be generated; Austrian environmentalists had prevented the building of a hydroelectric power plant in a nature reserve within Austria. 176 Similarly, European Union countries refuse to allow cyanide heap leaching in their own territory, yet permit the purchase of metals obtained by the same process in other countries.
177
Another Danubian problem not present along the Rhine in 1986 is the desperate poverty of some of the lower riparians. Romania (which is an upper riparian on the Tisza and a lower riparian on the Danube itself) has an annual per capita gross national product (GNP) of $1,600. This falls somewhat lower than the GPA of El Salvador. 178 In stark contrast, Hungary's annual per capita GNP, at $4,340, is nearly three times as Virginia Environmental Law Journal [Vol. nn:ppp high; Germany's, at $28,870, is more than eighteen times as high.
179
Bulgaria and Ukraine are even worse off than Romania. 180 While no reliable information is currently available for most of the states of the former Yugoslavia, it seems safe to conclude that economic conditions there are truly desperate.
Given such disparities, wealthier states (including non-riparians such as Australia) will continue to fund environmentally undesirable projects in the poorer riparian states. In Romania, for example, both the government and the people seem committed to environmental protection. At the same time, however, Romania cannot afford to turn away foreign investors offering jobs and development. The problem can only be addressed by adopting and enforcing stringent environmental safeguards.
The regulations must be adopted and enforced either by the investing country (in this case Australia), or by the country hosting the investment (in this case Romania). There are problems with both approaches. Australia, like most other developed countries, has been unwilling to apply its environmental standards to activities of its citizens abroad.
181 While a change would be welcome, such a strategy would only become effective when adopted by nearly all investing states.
At the same time, Romania may feel that it cannot afford to adopt environmental regulations as stringent as Australia's or the European Union's. A mining operation, for example, would be far cheaper in Romania, even applying Australian environmental standards, than in Australia. Other developing countries, though, might compete to make themselves more attractive to investors by offering lower environmental protection costs.
As with the problem of extraterritorial application of domestic environmental laws, this problem cannot be solved on a global scale until nearly all of the investment-receiving countries agree on some uniform standards. However, the problem can be solved on a local scale. The effective enforcement of some internationally determined minimum level of environmental standards in the Danube basin would prevent a "race to the bottom" in environmental standards among the developing riparians, while leaving developed riparians free to set higher standards.
Political and diplomatic obstacles to achieving such uniformity also exist. Along the Danube, the major obstacle of this nature is the continuing isolation of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia remains the recipient, 179 See id. As recently as 1992, an incredible 70.9% of Romanians lived on less than $2 per day. See id. at 65. 180 See id. at 12-14. 181 See supra notes 54-58, and accompanying text.
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From Schweizerhalle to Baia Mare 127 rather than the source, of many of the Danube's problems. Within Yugoslavia, the river has suffered both from the Romanian spills and from the war with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), two of whose members (Germany and Hungary) are Danube riparians. 182 However, activities in Yugoslavia have enormous potential to cause harm to other riparians. This is not to suggest a general rapprochement with Yugoslavia. 183 However, those riparians situated downstream from Yugoslavia -especially the major riparians, Bulgaria and Romania -can only be harmed by excluding Yugoslavia from the Danube treaty regime. The ideal solution would be a rehabilitated Yugoslavia; however, in the interim provisional steps to ensure Yugoslavia's cooperation must be taken.
B. Saving Europe's Other Rivers
The other problem, emphasized by the fourteen years between Schweizerhalle and Baia Mare, is that international environmental law tends to grow in reaction to catastrophic incidents. Most environmental harm is caused by activities that are routine, quotidian, and dull; they do not capture the public imagination, and thus do not evoke the same level of regulatory response.
International environmental law is thereby distorted; after the horse has gone, rule-makers and the public install new locks on the stable door, pat themselves on the back, and go on to something new. Chronic polluting activity is often overlooked, as is the possibility of similar disasters elsewhere.
In the aftermath of Schweizerhalle, the Rhine riparians succeeded in saving the Rhine. In the aftermath of Baia Mare, the riparian states will probably succeed in saving the Tisza and the Danube. Europe, however, has many other vulnerable international river basins. The Dniester, the Dnieper, the Volga, the Don, and the Oder, among others, are all endangered. 184 It would be unfair to say that in the aftermath of the Rhine disaster Virginia Environmental Law Journal [Vol. nn:ppp nothing was done to protect Europe's other rivers. The U.N./ECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes was adopted six years after the accident. 185 The U.N. Convention is a step in the right direction; more generalized global conventions, such as the Non-navigational Uses Convention, tend to be less useful, since the problems of river basins are by their nature local rather than global. The difference in the nature of watercourses, their ecologies, and the political and economic nature of the states lying within their basins makes universal rulemaking impossible. For instance, it would be hard to imagine that anything other than the most basic principles could be equally applicable to the Amazon, the Nile, the Columbia, the Rio Grande, and the Danube.
Within Europe, there is still enormous political, economic, and environmental diversity among river basins. The U.N. Convention is a good beginning; it also exhorts its parties to further their efforts. 186 The Baia Mare and Baia Borsa spills highlight the need, at least within Europe, for continuing efforts to develop international legal structures to protect the waters of specific individual drainage basins.
